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Public goodsThe government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. Who
should be the owner of the public project? In an incomplete contracting model in which ex post negotiations are
without frictions, the party that values the public goodmost should be the owner, regardless of technological as-
pects. However, under the plausible assumption that there are bargaining frictions, the optimal ownership struc-
ture depends on technological aspects and on the parties' valuations. We show that the differences between
incomplete contracting models with public goods and private goods are thus smaller than has previously been
thought.
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Public goods are often produced by partners who care about the
beneﬁts of the public good. The partnersmay be different public entities
(say, federal and local government agencies), or theremay be a “public–
private partnership” in which the responsibility for the delivery of pub-
lic goods and services is shared between the state and the private sector.
Following Besley and Ghatak (2001), as a lead example we consider a
partnership between the government and an NGO which directly
cares about a public project. Should the government or the NGO own
the public project? In this paper, we provide a new perspective on
how ownershipmatters in public good provisionwhen contracts are in-
complete. Speciﬁcally, we argue that in the presence of bargaining fric-
tions the qualitative differences between incomplete contracting
models with public goods and private goods may actually be smaller
than has previously been thought.e co-editor for making valuable
ry helpful discussions with Eva
support under the Institutional
n Excellence Initiative (Hans-
. This is an open access article underIt is by nowwidely appreciated that the property rights theory based
on incomplete contracting, which has been developed in the seminal
contributions by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990),
and Hart (1995), provides a very useful framework for investigating
the implications of ownership allocations in various contexts.1 Speciﬁ-
cally, consider two parties that at some future date 2 can collaborate
to generate a surplus. Collaboration cannot be contractually speciﬁed
before date 2. At date 1, the parties have to make relationship-speciﬁc
investment decisions. Ownership determines the parties' default pay-
offs (i.e., what the parties would get if they did not collaborate at date
2). In the property rights theory, it is usually assumed that at date 2
there are no frictions at all, so negotiations always lead to ex post efﬁ-
ciency, regardless of the ownership structure. Speciﬁcally, the date-2
negotiations are modelled by the Nash bargaining solution. Ownership
matters, because it increases (the owner's default payoff and hence)
the fraction of the collaboration surplus that the owner will get at date
2, thereby improving the owner's investment incentives at date 1. As a
consequence, the optimal ownership structure depends on the invest-
ment technology. In particular, the party whose investments are more1 See Segal andWhinston (2013) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on prop-
erty rights. Legros and Newman (2014) provide a recent literature reviewwith a focus on
applications in the ﬁeld of industrial organization.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
24 P.W. Schmitz / Journal of Public Economics 132 (2015) 23–31important should be the owner, and joint asset ownership (where each
party has veto power) is suboptimal.
The standard property rights theory was motivated by the analysis
of the pros and cons of vertical integration and has thus been developed
in a private-good framework. In an important contribution, Besley and
Ghatak (2001) have pointed out that the conclusions of the standard
property rights theory do no longer hold in the context of public
goods. They explore whether the government or an NGO should own
the physical assets needed to provide a public good, and they show
that the party who values the public good most should always be the
owner, regardless of the investment technology.
In the present paper, we reconsider Besley and Ghatak's (2001)
public-good setting. However, while they assume that there are no
bargaining frictions at date 2, we allow for ex post inefﬁciencies. Indeed,
also Besley andGhatak (2001, p. 1348) acknowledge that a “model with
contracting imperfections” is actually “more realistic” than amodelwith
frictionless contracting. Yet, as in the standard property rights theory,
they assume that contracting imperfections exist only ex ante, but not
ex post.
In the real world, frictionless bargaining is hard to imagine,2 and ne-
gotiations between the government and an NGO may well fail. For ex-
ample, consider the recent case of Relationships Aotearoa (RA), a not-
for-proﬁt organization with charitable status, which used to be New
Zealand's largest professional counselling and family therapy provider.
In 2013–2014, the organization deliveredmore than 50,000 counselling
hours to more than 27,000 people, dealing with issues such as parent-
ing, family conﬂict, and domestic violence. The organization also provid-
ed professional training, supervision, andmediation for people working
in demanding workplaces.3 RA has closed on June 9, 2015. Negotiations
between RA and government agencies failed twoweeks earlier. Accord-
ing to RA, the Ministry of Social Development broke good faith
provisions,4while the Social DevelopmentMinister Anne Tolley claimed
that RAwere “the ones who pulled out of negotiations.”5 RA Spokesper-
son Cary Hayward argued that “the government was wanting a Rolls
Royce service on a Morris Minor fee,” while Tolley said that RA “had a
pretty unstable chief executive role, four chief executives in a short pe-
riod of time, I don’t think that helps any organisation, specially when
they’re at a time of change.”6 The example illustrates that ex post hag-
gling and frictions in the sense of Williamson (1985) may well lead to
a bargaining breakdown between government and NGO.7
Indeed, several authors such as Holmström and Roberts (1998) and
Williamson (2000) have criticized the standard property rights theory
for neglecting the possibility of ex post inefﬁciencies. Yet, we will
show that the introduction of ex post bargaining frictions does not qual-
itatively change the central conclusions of the standard property rights
theory in the private-good framework. In contrast, in the public-good
context, Besley and Ghatak's (2001) ﬁnding is not robust once we
allow for date-2 bargaining frictions.2 See e.g. Baird (2013, p. 59), who argues that we “do not live in this counterfactual
world of frictionless bargaining,” emphasizing the fact that negotiations sometimes fail.
Williamson (1999, p. 316) points out that it is elementary “that frictionless ideals cannot
be implemented” in practice.
3 For more detailed information on Relationships Aotearoa, see their Annual Report
2013–2014.
4 See NewZealandHerald, “Counselling service forced to shut doors thisweek,”May26,
2015.
5 See TVNZ, “Anne Tolley tells counselling service to ‘calm down’ after it conﬁrms clo-
sure,” May 26, 2015.
6 See Radio New Zealand, “Take over of Relationships Aotearoa clients,” May 26, 2015.
7 See the Supplementary Material for a detailed description of a similar real-world ex-
ample in which bargaining frictions have ultimately led to a negotiation breakdown, in-
volving the Northeast Resource Recovery Association (a not-for-proﬁt organization that
serves communities in New England) and the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources. In
both cases aggrievement seems to have contributed to the bargaining breakdowns; note
that the destructive effects of aggrievement have recently also been emphasized in the
contracts-as-reference-points literature (see Hart and Moore, 2007, 2008; Halonen-
Akatwijuka and Hart, 2013).Speciﬁcally, we introduce a friction parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1], such that
the share 1− ρ of the additional surplus that can be generated by the
date-2 negotiations will not be realized.8 Thus, given risk-neutrality,
the simplest interpretation of our model is that an ex post efﬁcient
agreement is reached with probability ρ, while there is an ex post inef-
ﬁcient bargaining breakdown with probability 1 − ρ.9 As a conse-
quence, in the presence of frictions the optimal ownership structure is
no longer entirely determined by investment incentives, but it also de-
pends on the size of the deadweight loss in the date-2 bargaining stage.
We show that for every ρ b 1, there are situations inwhich ownership of
the public good should residewith the party that has a technological ad-
vantage, even if the other party has a larger valuation of the public good.
Hence, our ﬁndings show that when contracting imperfections are also
present ex post, then the main conclusions of the original property
rights theory as developed by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and
Moore (1990), and Hart (1995) also have bite in the context of public
goods.
Intuitively, when there are frictions in the date-2 negotiations, then
the parties' investment incentives depend to a larger extent on their de-
fault payoffs, which in turn depend on the ownership structure. It is
then no longer true that the party who values the public good most
should be the owner, since the increased importance of the default pay-
offs implies that the investment incentives may be stronger if the party
with themore productive investment technology is the owner, just as in
the standard private-good case. Moreover, ownership by the party with
the more productive investment technology can now be optimal even
when it does not yield larger investment incentives, since larger default
payoffs now imply a smaller deadweight loss in the date-2 bargaining
stage.
Finally, one might argue that Besley and Ghatak's (2001) result
should not be taken literally and that their main insight is that in the
context of public goods the optimal ownership structure is not entirely
driven by technological aspects. However, also in the context of private
goods optimal ownership does not entirely depend on technological as-
pects. We show that in a straightforward private-good variant of our
model the parties' relative valuations of the private good also have an
impact on the optimal ownership structure, even in the standard case
without bargaining frictions. The presence of bargaining frictions fur-
ther strengthens the impact of the parties' valuations. Taken together,
our results thus show that the qualitative differences between the
public-good case and the private-good case are actually smaller than
is suggested by the previous literature.
1.1. Related literature
Besley and Ghatak's (2001) model has been extended in several
directions. Halonen-Akatwijuka and Paﬁlis (2009) study a repeated-
game variant of Besley and Ghatak's (2001) setup and they ﬁnd
that the optimal ownership structure depends on the elasticity of
investments.10 Francesconi and Muthoo (2011) consider impure public
goods (i.e., public goods that can be excludable) and they show that the
optimal allocation of authority depends on technological factors.
Halonen-Akatwijuka (2012) extends Besley and Ghatak's (2001)8 The linear speciﬁcation is a shortcut just like the traditional shadow costs of public
funds (see e.g. the textbook by Laffont and Tirole, 1993) or the leaky-bucket model intro-
duced by Tirole (1992). In the Supplementary Material it is demonstrated that related in-
sights can also be obtained when there are negotiation costs which are not linear in the
date-2 negotiation surplus.
9 Our formalization of the date-2 bargaining frictions is thus similar to Schwartz and
Watson's (2004) model of costly renegotiation. Laffont and Martimort (2002, ch. 9.2)
and Kvaløy and Olsen (2015) study related models in which an agreement is enforced
with a probability smaller than one. The fact that enforcement of contractual agreements
may be imperfect in particular in less developed countries has also been stressed by
Laffont and Meleu (2000).
10 The fact that property rights models are sensitive to repeated interactions has also
been demonstrated in the context of private goods by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy
(2002) and Halonen (2002).
25P.W. Schmitz / Journal of Public Economics 132 (2015) 23–31model by allowing agents to be indispensable and she demonstrates
that the nature of human capital is an important determinant of the op-
timal ownership structure.11 Yet, none of these papers allow ex post
bargaining frictions.
1.2. Organization of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce the model. In Section 3, we derive the outcome of the date-2
negotiations when there are bargaining frictions. In Section 4, the
parties' date-1 investments are characterized. The optimal ownership
structures are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we compare the im-
plications of bargaining frictions in the public-good case with a
private-good benchmark model. Concluding remarks follow in
Section 7. Formal proofs have been relegated to the Appendix A.
2. The model
There are two risk-neutral parties, the government (G) and a non-
governmental organization (N). The two parties can collaborate at
some future date 2 in order to provide a public good. Who should
own the physical assets that are needed to provide the public good?
The main question of our study is whether ownership by the govern-
ment (o = G) or ownership by the non-governmental organization
(o= N) leads to a larger expected total surplus.
At date 1, the two partiesG andN simultaneously choose observable
but non-contractible investment levels g ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0, which are mea-
sured by their costs. In line with the by now standard incomplete
contracting approach, it is assumed that the public good which can be
provided ex post is not yet contractible ex ante.12
The provision of the public good becomes contractible at date 2. If
the two parties G and N agree to collaborate at date 2, then they can to-
gether provide the quantity αGy(g) + αNy(n) of the public good, where
the standard assumptions y(0) = 0, y′(0) = ∞, y′(∞) = 0, and y″ b 0
hold.13 The parameters αG N 0 and αN N 0 determine whether the gov-
ernment (αG N αN) or the non-governmental organization (αN N αG)
has a technological advantage.
If the parties fail to collaborate at date 2, then the quantity of the
public good is determined by the ownership structure. In particular, if
the parties do not collaborate, then the quantity of the public good is
only αGy(g) + λNαNy(n) if o = G, and it is only λGαGy(g) + αNy(n) if
o=N, where λN ∈ (0, 1) and λG ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the owner can always re-
alize the full returns of his own investments. However, if the parties do
not collaborate at date 2, then the owner can realize only a fraction of
the returns of the other party's investments. In other words, a part of
the investment returns is embodied in the investor's human capital
and is hence lostwhen the investor does not collaborate in the provision
of the public good (cf. Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997). Following
Besley and Ghatak (2001), we also consider the case of joint ownership
(o= J), whichmeans that both the government and the NGO have veto11 See also Rasul (2006), who studies an application to child custody, and Grosjean
(2010), who introduces maintenance costs into a variant of Besley and Ghatak's (2001)
model. Halonen-Akatwijuka and Paﬁlis (2014) investigate location choice and ﬁnd that
it can be optimal to separate location from ownership. See also Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1997) and Hoppe and Schmitz (2010), who consider optimal ownership structures in
models of public-good provision inwhich (in contrast to Besley andGhatak, 2001) the pri-
vate party does not directly care about the public good.
12 The foundations of the incomplete contracting paradigm are still a matter of ongoing
research (see Tirole, 1999, for a vivid discussion of this controversial debate). Maskin and
Tirole (1999) argue that non-describability of future contingencies can be circumvented
by suitablemechanisms (while non-foreseeability of future payoff consequences is incom-
patible with the incomplete contracting methodology). Yet, Hart andMoore (1999) point
out that renegotiation may undermine the effectiveness of subgame-perfect implementa-
tionmechanisms. Recently, experimental studies have also cast doubt on the usefulness of
such mechanisms (see Fehr, Powell, and Wilkening, 2014).
13 The speciﬁcation of the production function follows Besley and Ghatak (2001,
p. 1355).power over the use of the physical assets and hence the public good is
not provided if the parties do not agree to collaborate at date 2.
Let the government's valuation of the public good be denoted by
θG N 0, and let the non-governmental organization's valuation be denot-
ed by θN N 0. As a consequence, the parties' date-2 payoffs are as shown
in Table 1, where t is a (possibly negative) transfer payment from the
government to the non-governmental organization.
2.1. The ﬁrst-best benchmark
In a ﬁrst-best world, i.e. in the absence of any contracting problems,
the parties would always collaborate at date 2, such that no part of the
investment returns would be lost. At date 1, the parties would choose
the investment levels g and n that maximize the total surplus
(θG + θN)[αGy(g) + αNy(n)]− g− n. Hence, the ﬁrst-best investment
levels gFB and nFB are implicitly characterized by
θG þ θNð ÞαGy0 g FB
  ¼ 1;
θG þ θNð ÞαNy0 nFB
  ¼ 1:
Note that in line with the standard property rights approach
(cf. Hart, 1995), ownership does not matter in a ﬁrst-best world.
3. Ex post negotiations
Followingmost contributions to the literature on the property rights
theory, Besley and Ghatak (2001) model the date-2 negotiations using
the regular Nash bargaining solution, where the default payoffs consti-
tute the threatpoint.14 Thus, in the case of successful negotiations, the
parties agree on a transfer payment t such that at date 2 each party
gets its default payoff (which it would get in case of disagreement)
plus half of the date-2 negotiation surplus (i.e., the additional surplus
that is generated by collaboration).
In contrast to Besley and Ghatak (2001), we allow negotiations to be
plagued by frictions. Speciﬁcally, as explained in the Introduction, we
assume that there is a friction parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1] such that with prob-
ability 1− ρ the negotiations fail, which implies that in expectation the
share 1− ρ of the date-2 negotiation surplus is lost.15
Hence, if the government is the owner (o = G), then the
government's date-2 payoff is
uGG g;nð Þ ¼ θG αGy gð Þ þ λNαNy nð Þ½  þ ρΔG nð Þ=2
and the NGO's date-2 payoff reads
uGN g;nð Þ ¼ θN αGy gð Þ þ λNαNy nð Þ½  þ ρΔG nð Þ=2;
where the date-2 negotiation surplus ΔG(n) is given by
ΔG nð Þ ¼ θG þ θNð Þ αGy gð Þ þ αNy nð Þ− αGy gð Þ þ λNαNy nð Þ½ ½ 
¼ θG þ θNð Þ 1−λNð ÞαNy nð Þ:
Thus, when the negotiations are costless, then each party gets its de-
fault payoff plus half of the date-2 negotiation surplus (the total surplus
given collaborationminus the total default surplus). Yet, when the date-
2 negotiations are costly, then only a share ρ b 1 of the date-214 Schmitz (2014) shows that Besley and Ghatak's (2001) results are robust if instead of
the split-the-difference rule the deal-me-out solution is applied,where the default payoffs
are treated as bounds on the bargaining set (cf. Chiu, 1998; DeMeza and Lockwood, 1998,
and Rajan and Zingales, 1998, for applications of the deal-me-out solution in private-good
settings). Moreover, Schmitz (2013) shows that Besley and Ghatak's (2001) central in-
sight that the optimal choice between o= G and o= N does not depend on technological
aspects is also robust if the generalized Nash bargaining solution is applied. These papers
do not allow for ex post bargaining frictions.
15 In the SupplementaryMaterial it is demonstrated that the central insights of the pres-
ent paper also hold if we replace the split-the-difference rule by the deal-me-out solution.
Table 1
The parties' date-2 payoffs.
Payoff of party G Payoff of party N
Collaboration θG[αGy(g) + αNy(n)]− t θN[αGy(g) + αNy(n)] + t
Default, o= G θG[αGy(g) + λNαNy(n)] θN[αGy(g) + λNαNy(n)]
Default, o= N θG[λGαGy(g) + αNy(n)] θN[λGαGy(g) + αNy(n)]
Default, o= J 0 0
26 P.W. Schmitz / Journal of Public Economics 132 (2015) 23–31negotiation surplus ΔG(n) can be realized (or, equivalently, the date-2
negotiation surplus is realized with probability ρ b 1 only).
If the non-governmental organization is the owner (o=N), then the
government's date-2 payoff reads
uNG g;nð Þ ¼ θG λGαGy gð Þ þ αNy nð Þ½  þ ρΔN gð Þ=2
and the NGO's date-2 payoff is
uNN g;nð Þ ¼ θN λGαGy gð Þ þ αNy nð Þ½  þ ρΔN gð Þ=2:
In this case, the date-2 negotiation surplus is given by
ΔN gð Þ ¼ θG þ θNð Þ αGy gð Þ þ αNy nð Þ− λGαGy gð Þ þ αNy nð Þ½ ½ 
¼ θG þ θNð Þ 1−λGð ÞαGy gð Þ:
Observe that the date-2 negotiation surplus in the case of N-
ownership depends on the government's investment g, but not on the
NGO's investment n (while the opposite holds under o=G). The reason
is that if no agreement is reached under N-ownership, then the fraction
1− λG of the government's investment return is lost, so the surplus that
is generated by the date-2 negotiations depends on the government's
investment, but not on the NGO's investment.
If there is joint ownership (o= J), then the date 2-payoffs of the gov-
ernment and the NGO, respectively, are given by
uJG g;nð Þ ¼ 0þ ρΔ J g;nð Þ=2;
uJN g;nð Þ ¼ 0þ ρΔ J g;nð Þ=2:
The date-2 negotiation surplus in the case of joint ownership is
Δ J g;nð Þ ¼ θG þ θNð Þ αGy gð Þ þ αNy nð Þ½ :
Note that under joint ownership, the date-2 negotiation surplus de-
pends on both the government's and the NGO's investment.
4. Ex ante investment incentives
Let us now analyze the parties' date-1 investment incentives. Given
the ownership structure o ∈ {G,N, J}, the parties anticipate that at date 2
the government's payoff will be uGo(g, n) and the NGO's payoff will be
uN
o (g, n). Since the investments are measured by their costs, this
means that at date 1 party G chooses the investment level
go ¼ argmax uoG g;noð Þ−g;
while party N chooses the investment level
no ¼ argmax uoN go;nð Þ−n:
As a consequence, under G-ownership the investment levels of the
two parties are implicitly characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions
θGαGy0 gG
  ¼ 1;
θNλN þ ρ θG þ θNð Þ 1−λNð Þ=2½ αNy0 nG
  ¼ 1:
The ﬁrst-order conditions require that each party's marginal invest-
ment returnsmust be equal to themarginal investment costs, which areone. Analogously, under N-ownership the investment levels are charac-
terized by
θGλG þ ρ θG þ θNð Þ 1−λGð Þ=2½ αGy0 gN
  ¼ 1;
θNαNy0 nN
  ¼ 1:
Under joint ownership (o= J), the two parties' investment levels are
implicitly given by the conditions
ρ θG þ θNð ÞαGy0 g J
 
=2 ¼ 1;
ρ θG þ θNð ÞαNy0 nJ
 
=2 ¼ 1:
Observe that under all ownership structures there is always under-
investment compared to the ﬁrst-best solution, because the marginal
private investment returns are always smaller than the marginal social
investment returns.
We can now compare the investment decisions that the parties
make in the different ownership structures. Speciﬁcally, inspection of
the ﬁrst-order conditions shows that the government invests more
under G-ownership than under N-ownership (gG N gN) whenever
θGNθGλG þ ρ θG þ θNð Þ 1−λGð Þ=2;
which is equivalent to (2 − ρ)θG N ρθN. Note that if there are no
bargaining frictions (ρ= 1), then the government invests more under
o=G than under o=Nwhenever it is the governmentwho has a larger
valuation of the public good. Yet, in the presence of frictions, it maywell
be the case that the government has stronger investment incentives
under o = G than under o = N even when it is the NGO who has the
larger valuation.
The NGO invests more under G-ownership than under N-ownership
(nG N nN) whenever
θNλN þ ρ θG þ θNð Þ 1−λNð Þ=2NθN ;
which can be rewritten as ρθG N (2− ρ)θN. Now suppose the govern-
ment has a larger valuation of the public good than the NGO. In this
case, G-ownership yields larger investment incentives for the NGO
than N-ownership if there are no bargaining frictions. However, the
presence of bargaining frictions may imply that the NGO has stronger
investment incentives under N-ownership.
The government's investment incentives are stronger under G-
ownership than under joint ownership whenever θG N ρ(θG + θN)/2.
Moreover, the government's investment level under N-ownership
is larger than its investment under joint ownership whenever
θGλG + ρ(θG + θN)(1 − λG)/2 N ρ(θG + θN)/2. Both conditions are
equivalent to (2 − ρ)θG N ρθN. Analogously, the NGO has stronger
incentives under sole ownership (regardless of whether the govern-
ment or the NGO is the owner) than under joint ownership whenever
(2− ρ)θN N ρθG holds.
The preceding analysis immediately implies the following results.
Proposition 1.
(i) If ρ b 2θG/(θG+ θN), then the government's investment levels can be
ranked as follows: gJ b gN b gG b gFB. If ρ N 2θG/(θG + θN), then the
government's investments satisfy gG b gN b gJ b gFB.
(ii) If ρ b 2θN/(θG+ θN), then the NGO's investment levels can be ranked
as follows: nJ b nG b nN b nFB. If ρ N 2θN/(θG + θN), then the NGO's
investments satisfy nN b nG b nJ b nFB.
Corollary 1.(i) Suppose ρ= 1. If θG N θN, then both parties choose a larger invest-
ment level under o=G thanunder o=N. If θN N θG, then both parties
choose a larger investment level under o = N than under o = G.
27P.W. Schmitz / Journal of Public Economics 132 (2015) 23–31(ii) If ρ b 2min{θG, θN}/(θG+ θN), then party G invests more under o=G
than under o=N, and party N invests more under o=N than under
o = G. Moreover, joint ownership leads to smaller investments than
sole ownership (regardless of whether the government or the NGO
is the owner).
To summarize, in the special case of frictionless negotiations (ρ=1),
the investment incentives of both parties are always aligned under sole
ownership (while under joint ownership, the party with the larger
valuation has relatively weak investment incentives and the party
with the smaller valuation has relatively strong investment incentives).
However, when the date-2 negotiations are costly, there may well be a
trade-off between the two parties' investment incentives under o= N
and o=G. The smaller is ρ, the stronger is the impact of the default pay-
offs on the parties' incentives to invest.16 As a consequence, under the
condition of Corollary 1(ii), a party has larger investment incentives
whenever it is the owner (and joint ownership yields only weak invest-
ment incentives for both parties), which is in accordance with the stan-
dard property rights theory (cf. Hart, 1995).
5. Optimal ownership structures
We can now compare the total surplus levels that are attained under
the different ownership structures when the parties choose the invest-
ment levels that we have characterized in the preceding section. Specif-
ically, the total surplus under ownership structure o= G is given by
SG gG;nG
  ¼ θG þ θNð Þ αGy gG
  þ λNαNy nG
  
þ ρ θG þ θNð Þ 1−λNð ÞαNy nG
 
−nG−gG;
while the total surplus under the ownership structure o= N is given by
SN gN ;nN
  ¼ θG þ θNð Þ λGαGy gN
  þ αNy nN
  
þ ρ θG þ θNð Þ 1−λGð ÞαGy gN
 
−nN−gN :
Under joint ownership (o= J), the total surplus is
SJ g J ;nJ
  ¼ ρ θG þ θNð Þ αGy g J
  þ αNy nJ
  
−nJ−g J :
Note that the total surplus functions are concave in the investments.
Since according to Proposition 1 there is always underinvestment com-
pared to the ﬁrst-best benchmark, this means that ceteris paribus larger
investment levels are always desirable. Yet, observe that SG(g, n) =
SN(g, n) = S J(g, n) holds only in the special case in which there are no
bargaining frictions (ρ= 1). In this case, the optimal ownership struc-
ture is solely determined by the parties' investment incentives. In con-
trast, when there are bargaining frictions, the optimal ownership
structure also depends on the magnitude of the date-2 negotiation sur-
plus that is lost in the date-2 bargaining stage.
The ﬁndings summarized in the following proposition are a conse-
quence of the preceding analysis.
Proposition 2.
(i) Suppose ρ = 1. If θG N θN, then SG(gG, nG) N SN(gN, nN). If θN N θG,
then SN(gN, nN) N SG(gG, nG).
(ii) For any ρ b 1, there exist αN N αG such that SN(gN, nN) N SG(gG, nG)
holds despite θG N θN.16 For instance, consider the case θG N θN and λN=0. Then under o= G party N's default
payoff does not depend on its investment, while under o= N party N's marginal invest-
ment returns with regard to its default payoff are θNαNy′(n). When ρ= 0, such that only
the default payoffs are relevant, it is obvious that party N invests more under o= N than
under o= G. In contrast, if there are no frictions (ρ= 1), then party N's marginal invest-
ment return is (θG+ θN)αNy′(n)/2 under o=G, while it remains θNαNy′(n) under o=N, so
o= G yields larger investment incentives.(iii) For any ρ b 1, there exist αG N αN such that SG(gG, nG) N SN(gN, nN)
holds despite θN N θG.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2(i) replicates the main ﬁnding of Besley and Ghatak
(2001), which holds in the special case in which there are no frictions
(ρ= 1). However, Proposition 2(ii) and (iii) show that this ﬁnding is
not robust when we allow for bargaining frictions at date 2. No matter
how small these frictions are, whenever ρ b 1 there are circumstances
under which a technological advantage of a party makes ownership by
this party preferable to ownership by the other party, which is in accor-
dance with the standard property rights theory as synthesized by Hart
(1995). Intuitively, in the presence of bargaining frictions, the invest-
ment incentives depend to a larger extent on the default payoffs,
which favours ownership by the party who has the more efﬁcient in-
vestment technology. Moreover, in the presentmodel ex post efﬁciency
is not always achieved, so the optimal ownership structure is not only
determined by the investment incentives, but also by the avoidance of
welfare losses due to bargaining frictions ex post. Thus, an ownership
structure that leads to larger default payoffs is desirable, since it reduces
the losses in the ex post bargaining stage. This effect occurs neither in
Besley and Ghatak's (2001) model nor in the standard property rights
model along the lines of Hart (1995), but it ends up strengthening the
conclusions of the latter model.
Speciﬁcally, there is a critical value ρ^ such that for ρ b ρ^ it is always
true that if only one party has a relevant investment decision, then
this party should be the owner, and joint ownership is always subopti-
mal. These conclusions resemble the ﬁndings in the standard private-
goods setting (see the following section). It should be noted that the
critical value of ρ is even larger than the one identiﬁed in Corollary
1(ii), because in the presence of bargaining frictions an ownership
structure can be optimal even if it yields weaker investment incentives,
provided that the ownership structure implies smaller welfare losses at
the date-2 bargaining stage.
Proposition 3. There exists a critical value ρ^N2minfθG; θNg=ðθG þ θNÞ,
such that when ρ b ρ^ the following results hold regardless of θN and θG.
(i) If αN N 0 and αG → 0, then o = N must be optimal. (ii) If αG N 0 and
αN→ 0, then o = G must be optimal. (iii) Joint ownership is suboptimal.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As an illustration, consider Fig. 1.17 In the upper panel on the left-
hand side, the case ρ= 1 is depicted. In this special case, whether or
not o = N is better then o = G does not depend on the technology.
Moreover, note that there are relatively large regions in which joint
ownership is optimal. The upper panel on the right-hand side shows
that even when the bargaining frictions are very small (ρ=0.99), tech-
nology becomes a factor in determiningwhether o=N or o=G leads to
a larger total surplus, and joint ownership becomesmuch less attractive.
As can be seen in the lower panel on the right-hand side, in the case ρ=
0.9 joint ownership is never optimal and technology is a major factor in
determining the optimal ownership structure, just as it is the case in the
standard property rights theory.
6. Public vs. private goods
In the preceding section, we have seen that Besley and Ghatak's
(2001) main ﬁnding regarding optimal ownership of public goods is
not robust when we allow for bargaining frictions. One might wonder
whether bargaining frictions may also invalidate the main conclusions17 In the ﬁgure, y(∙) is given by the square root function, λG = λN = 1/4, θG = 2,
θN ∈ (1, 3), αG = 1/2, and αN ∈ (0, 1).
Table 2
The parties' date-2 payoffs in the private-good case.
Payoff of party G Payoff of party N
α
θ
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
1.5
2.5
3.0
θ
o* = N
o* = G
o* = J
o* = J
θ
αα0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
1.5
2.5
3.0
θ
θ
o* = N
o* = G
αα
o* = J
o* = J
= 1 = 0.99
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
1.5
2.5
3.0
α
θ
α
o* = N
o* = G
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
1.5
2.5
3.0
α
θ
o* = N
o* = G
o* = J
= 0.95 = 0.9θ
Fig. 1. The optimal ownership structure o∗ ∈ {G, N, J}, depending on the NGO's technology parameter αN and the NGO's valuation θN. In each case, αG = 0.5 and θG = 2.
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by Hart (1995). In this section, we brieﬂy illustrate that this is not the
case.
Consider the following straightforward private-good variant of our
property rights model. Suppose without loss of generality that θG ≥ θN,
such that if the parties agree to collaborate, party G gets the total
quantity of the produced private good and makes a positive payment
t to party N (the case θN N θG can be treated analogously). The
parties' date-2 payoffs are now as shown in Table 2.18 Note that the
ﬁrst-best investment levels are characterized by θGαGy′(gFB) = 1 and
θGαNy′(nFB) = 1.
In analogy to the analysis in the preceding sections, it is straightfor-
ward to derive the following ranking of the parties' investment levels
under the different ownership structures.
Lemma1. In the private-goodmodel, gJ= gN b gG= gFB andnJ=nG b nN ≤
nFB must hold.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As a consequence, also in analogy to the preceding analysis, we can
prove the followingﬁndings regarding the optimal ownership structure.
Remark 1. In the private-goodmodel, the following results hold regardless
of the bargaining friction parameter ρ. (i) If αN N 0 and αG → 0, then o=18 See the Supplementary Material for an analysis of the case of private goods with
externalities.Nmust be optimal. (ii) If αG N 0 and αN→ 0, then o= Gmust be optimal.
(iii) Joint ownership is suboptimal.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the standard property rights theory (cf. Hart, 1995), it is assumed
that there are no bargaining frictions (ρ= 1). The results reported in
Remark 1 summarize the main conclusions of the theory. Speciﬁcally,
if only one party has a relevant investment decision, then this party
should be the owner, and joint asset ownership is never optimal. The
proof of Remark 1 shows that these conclusions regarding the optimal
ownership structures are only strengthened if there are date-2 frictions
(ρ b 1), because then the total surplus levels under the ownership struc-
tures that are suboptimal are reduced to a larger extent than the total
surplus level under the optimal ownership structure.
Finally, while Besley and Ghatak's (2001) result regarding the irrel-
evance of technology is not robust once bargaining frictions are intro-
duced in the public-good setting, one might argue that a more general
implication of their model is that in the public-good case technology isCollaboration θG[αGy(g) + αNy(n)]− t t
Default, o= G θGαGy(g) 0
Default, o= N 0 θNαNy(n)
Default, o= J 0 0
= 1
θ
α α
o* = N
o* = G
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
1.5
2.5
3.0
= 0.9
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
1.5
2.5
3.0
θ
αα
o* = G
o* = N
θ θ
Fig. 2. The optimal ownership structure o∗ ∈ {G, N, J} in the private-good case, depending on party N's technology parameter αN and valuation θN. In each case, αG = 0.5 and θG = 2.
29P.W. Schmitz / Journal of Public Economics 132 (2015) 23–31not the only driver of ownership, because the parties' valuations of the
public good are also important determinants of the optimal ownership
structure. However, it should be emphasized that also in a private-
good setting it is true that the optimal ownership structure is not only
determined by technology. As an illustration, consider Fig. 2.19 Even if
the standard assumption ρ = 1 is made, it may well depend on the
parties' valuations of the private good whether o = N or o= G is opti-
mal. As amatter of fact, whenwe introduce bargaining frictions, the im-
pact of the parties' valuations becomes even stronger, as is illustrated in
the ﬁgure for the case ρ= 0.9.20 Taken together, our analysis thus re-
veals that the qualitative differences between the determinants of opti-
mal ownership structures in public-good and private-good frameworks
are actually smaller than is suggested by the previous literature.7. Conclusion
Should governments or private organizations be the owners of pub-
lic projects? This question might be one of the most fundamental prob-
lems in public economics.21 Besley and Ghatak (2001) have argued that
in the case of public goods, the party with the higher valuation should
be the owner, irrespective of the production technology. Yet, their con-
clusion crucially relies on a peculiar set of assumptions typicallymade in
the incomplete contracting literature. On the one hand, it is realistically
assumed that ex ante there are contracting imperfections, while on
the other hand, ex post bargaining is assumed to be without any
frictions. When we reduce the tension between these assumptions by
the introduction of ex post bargaining frictions, then the main conclu-
sions of the standard property rights theory in the private-good case
(as pioneered by Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990,
and Hart, 1995) still hold. Yet, Besley and Ghatak's (2001) public-good
result turns out not to be robust. When there are bargaining frictions,
then in the public-good case aswell as in the private-good case, optimal
ownership is driven by technological aspects as well as the parties' val-
uations. Hence, the qualitative differences between the determinants of
optimal ownership structures in public-good settings and private-good
settings are smaller than is suggested in the previous literature.19 In theﬁgure, y(∙) is again given by the square root function, θG=2, θN∈ (1, 3),αG=1/2,
and αN ∈ (0, 1).
20 For instance, consider the case θN b θG, such that o = G may be optimal even when
party N has a technological advantage (i.e., when αN N αG). When ρ decreases from 1 to
0.9, then party N's technological advantage that is compatible with the optimality of G-
ownership becomes even larger.
21 See e.g. Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011), Grimsey and Lewis (2004), and Yescombe
(2011) for numerous practical examples.It might be an interesting avenue for future research to further study
other ways of introducing ex post frictions into property rights models
and explore whether they may have qualitatively different effects on
the optimal ownership structures in private-good and public-good
frameworks.22 Moreover, it might be worthwhile to explore the role
of ex post bargaining frictions in models of public–private partnerships,
which combine incomplete contracting with the question whether or
not the construction of infrastructure projects and subsequent service
provision should be bundled.23
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) Suppose that ρ= 1, such that SG(g, n) = SN(g, n). Part (i) of the
proposition follows immediately from Corollary 1(i), concavity
of the total surplus function, and the fact that according to
Proposition 1 there is always underinvestment compared to the
ﬁrst-best solution.
(ii) Consider technology parameters αN N 0 and αG→ 0, such that gN
and gG go to zero. Moreover, consider valuations θG and θN with
θG N θN such that ρ b 2θN/(θG + θN) b 1 holds. Then nG b nN
must hold according to Proposition 1(ii). It follows that
SG(0, nG) b SG(0, nN) must be satisﬁed, because SG is concave and
nN b nFB. Furthermore, SG(0, nN) b SN(0, nN) must hold, because
SN(0, nN)− SG(0, nN) = (1− ρ)(θG + θN)(1− λN)αNy(nN) N 0.
Taken together, the condition SG(0, nG) b SN(0, nN) must be satis-
ﬁed. The claim then follows from continuity.
(iii) Consider αG N 0 and αN→ 0, such that nN→ 0 and nG→ 0. Con-
sider θG and θN with θN N θG, such that ρ b 2θG/(θG + θN) b 1.
Hence, gG N gN must hold according to Proposition 1(i). In
this case, SN(gN, 0) b SN(gG, 0) must be true since SN is concave
and gG b gFB. Moreover, SN(gG, 0) b SG(gG, 0) must hold since
SG(gG, 0)− SN(gG, 0) = (1− ρ)(θG + θN)(1− λG)αGy(gG) N 0.
As a consequence, SN(gN, 0) b SG(gG, 0) must be true, so the
claim follows immediately. □22 For example, ex post inefﬁciencies may be caused by asymmetric information (cf.
Schmitz, 2006, and Goldlücke and Schmitz, 2014) or by shading activities if parties do
not get what they feel entitled to when contracts serve as reference points (see Hart and
Moore, 2007, 2008, and Halonen-Akatwijuka and Hart, 2013).
23 See e.g. Hart (2003), Bennett and Iossa (2006), Chen and Chiu (2010, 2014), Hoppe
and Schmitz (2013), Iossa andMartimort (2012, 2015), and De Brux andDesrieux (2014).
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(i) Consider αN N 0 and αG→ 0. From the proof of Proposition 2(ii)
we know that if ρ b 2θN/(θG + θN), then N-ownership leads to a
larger total surplus than G-ownership. Since SN(0, nN) N SG(0, nN),
the condition SG(0, nG) b SN(0, nN) will be satisﬁed even when
nG N nN, provided that SG(0, nG) − SG(0, nN) N 0 is sufﬁciently
small. Hence, there exists a critical value of ρ strictly larger than
2θN/(θG+ θN) such thatN-ownership leads to a larger total surplus
than G-ownership for all ρ that are smaller than the critical value.
(ii) Consider αG N 0 and αN→ 0. From the proof of Proposition 2(iii)
we know that if ρ b 2θG/(θG + θN), then o = G yields a larger
total surplus than o= N. Since SG(gG, 0) N SN(gG, 0), the condition
SN(gN, 0) b SG(gG, 0) will be satisﬁed even when gN N gG, provided
that SN(gN, 0) − SN(gG, 0) N 0 is sufﬁciently small. Thus, there
exists a critical value of ρ strictly larger than 2θG/(θG + θN) such
that o = G leads to a larger total surplus than o = N for all ρ
smaller than the critical value.
(iii) We know from Corollary 1(ii) that if ρ b 2min{θG, θN}/
(θG + θN), then joint ownership leads to smaller investment
levels than o = G and o = N. Suppose θG N θN (the case
θN ≥ θG can be treated analogously). Observe that SG(g, n) −
S J(g, n) = (1 − ρ)(θG + θN)(αGy(g) + λNαNy(n)) N 0.
Thus, S J(gJ, nJ) b SJ(gG, nG) b SG(gG, nG) must hold. Moreover,
S J(g J, n J) b SG(gG, nG) will be satisﬁed even when gG b g J,
provided that S J(g J, n J) − S J(gG, nG) is sufﬁciently small.
Hence, there exists a critical value of ρ strictly larger than
2θG/(θG + θN) such that o = G yields a larger total surplus
than o = J for all ρ smaller than the critical value. □
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that θG ≥ θN (the case θN N θG can be treated
analogously). Consider o = G. In this case, party G's date-2 payoff is
uG
G(g, n) = θGαGy(g) + ρΔG(n)/2 and party N's date-2 payoff reads
uN
G(g, n) = ρΔG(n)/2, where the date-2 negotiation surplus is now
given by ΔG(n) = θGαNy(n). Next, consider o = N. Then the parties'
date-2 payoffs are given by uGN(g, n) = ρΔN(g, n)/2 and uNN(g, n) =
θNαNy(n)+ ρΔN(g, n)/2, respectively,where the date-2 negotiation sur-
plus is ΔN(g, n) = θGαGy(g) + (θG − θN)αNy(n). Finally, if there is joint
ownership (o = J), then the parties' date-2 payoffs are uGJ (g, n) =
uN
J(g, n) = ρΔ J(g, n)/2, where the date-2 negotiation surplus is
ΔJ(g, n) = θG[αGy(g) + αNy(n)].
At date 1, partyG chooses the investment level go=argmaxuGo(g,no)−
g and party N chooses the investment level no = argmax uNo(go, n)− n.
Under G-ownership the investment levels are thus implicitly characterized
by theﬁrst-order conditions θGαGy′(gG)=1andρθGαNy′(nG)/2=1.Under
N-ownership the investment levels are characterizedbyρθGαGy′(gN)/2=1
and [θN + ρ(θG − θN)/2]αNy′(nN) = 1. Finally, under joint ownership the
investment levels are implicitly given by ρθGαGy′(g J)/2 = 1 and ρθGαNy
′(nJ)/2 = 1.
The ﬁrst-order conditions and concavity of y(∙) immediately imply
that g J = gN b gG = gFB and nJ = nG b nN ≤ nFB must hold. □
Proof of Remark 1. Suppose again that θG ≥ θN (the case θN N θG can be
treated analogously). The total surplus levels in the private-good setting
are given by
SG gG;nG
  ¼ θG αGy gG
  þ ραNy nG
  
−gG−nG
in the case of G-ownership,
SN gN ;nN
  ¼ ρθGαGy gN
  þ θN þ ρ θG−θNð Þ½ αNy nN
 
−gN−nN
in the case of N-ownership, and
SJ g J ;nJ
  ¼ ρθG αGy g J
  þ αNy nJ
  
−g J−nJin the case of joint ownership. Recall from Lemma 1 that the invest-
ments are always weakly smaller than their ﬁrst-best benchmarks and
note that the total surplus functions are concave. Moreover, observe
that if ρ= 1, then SG(g, n) = SN(g, n) = S J(g, n) holds.
(i) ConsiderαN N 0 andαG→ 0, such that gN→ 0 and gG→ 0. If ρ=1,
then Lemma 1 immediately implies that SN(0, nN) N SG(0, nG)
must hold. Observe that this result is only strengthened if ρ be-
comes smaller than 1, since partyN's marginal investment return
is more reduced under o = G than under o= N and SN(0, n)−
SG(0, n) ≥ 0 is decreasing in ρ.
(ii) Now consider αG N 0 and αN → 0. Then nN → 0 and nG → 0
must hold. Moreover, if ρ = 1 then Lemma 1 immediately
implies SG(gG, 0) N SN(gN, 0). Note that this result is only
strengthened if ρ becomes smaller than 1, because gG remains
unchanged, gN becomes smaller, and SG(g, 0)− SN(g, 0) ≥ 0 is de-
creasing in ρ.
(iii) If ρ=1, Lemma 1 immediately implies that joint ownership can-
not be optimal. This ﬁnding is only strengthened if ρ b 1, because
under sole ownership the non-owner still makes the same in-
vestment as under joint ownership, while under o = G the
owner's investment remains unchanged and under o = N
the owner's investment incentives are not as much reduced
as under joint ownership, and SG(g, n) − S J(g, n) ≥ 0 and
SN(g, n)− S J(g, n) ≥ 0 are decreasing in ρ. □Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary material to this article can be found online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.009.
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